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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-Escheat by State of Unclaimed Funds Deposited to
Credit of United States Treasury-The federal court for the eastern district
of Pennsylvania found certain sums to be due bondholders domiciled in that
state.' The court ordered the unclaimed pprtion of the funds to be paid into its
registry, 2 an account being set up in the name of the court in the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia. Five years later, no claimant having as yet appeared, the
title of the account was changed to "Treasury of the United States", in accordance with the federal statute directing that such moneys should be deposited with
the Treasury until the rightful claimants appeared. 3 Subsequently, the State of
Pennsylvania, by an informer, petitioned the court for escheat of the deposit to it.
The petition was dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction, on the
ground that the state had shown no title to the fund in the absence of a court

adjudication to that effect. 4 Thereupon, in accordance with a state statute,5
seemingly passed for the very purpose of prosecuting the claim, 6 the commonwealth instituted suit in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County to
obtain a decree of escheat in its favor. The United States district attorney
appeared specially to contest the court's jurisdiction, alleging that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional in that it purported to confer jurisdiction to
determine the escheat of property not within the control of the commonwealth.
The court dismissed the petition. 7 Held, on appeal, that the lower court should
have entertained jurisdiction to determine the right of the state to have the property escheat. Appeal of Commonwealth; by Klein, 186 Atl. 6oo (Pa. 1936).
Inasmuch as escheat is not succession, but the exercise of sovereignty, the
normal rule that title to personalty passes according to the law of the decedent's
domicile 8 should not apply; instead, once it has been determined that under the
law of the domicile, the line of succession has ended, only the state of physical
situs may take.9 Therefore, since Pennsylvania had no physical control of the
property, the Pennsylvania courts should hold that the money did not escheat to
the commonwealth, whereas the supreme court intimated otherwise by dictum,
apparently upon the theory that the state succeeded to the*rights of the noni. Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co.,
2.

Ibid.
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Fed. 444 (E. D. Pa. 1916).

3. 41 STAT. 654 (1930), 28 U. S. C. A. § 851 (1927) (deposit to be made to credit of
United States Treasury) ; 36 STAT. 1O83 (I911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 852 (1927) (funds to be
held for rightful claimants).
4. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Pa., Sept. 6, 1934 (opinion unpublished).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 27, § I et seq.
6. The Act was amended to include the exact facts of this case on June 28, 1935.
7. Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 24, 1935, p. I, col. I, aff'd on rehearing,23 D. & C. 636
(Pa. 1935).
& RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT Or LAWS (1934) § 303.
9.In re Barnett's Trusts [19o2] I Ch.847; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 309.1;
see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 309. In 32 Ops. Atty. Gen. 268 (192o) it

was stated that United States registered bonds escheated to the state of domicile of the deceased registered payee, on the ground that the domicile's rules of distribution governed.
The opinion can be reconciled with the other authority, however, because of the fact that
the bonds themselves, i. e., the documents, were within the state of domicile and therefore
under its sovereign power.
The rule of Barnett's Trusts raises, of course, the vexatious question of the "physical
situs", for the purpose of escheat, of intangibles. In In re Lyon's Estate, 175 Wash. 115,
26 P. (2d) 615 (933) it was held that the domicile was the situs, the court relying on the
rule as to inheritance taxation, and speaking of escheat both as an exercise of sovereign
power and as a rule of succession.
(I09)
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claiming bondholders domiciled in Pennsylvania. If and when the commonwealth
presses its suit once more in the federal court on the basis of an escheat decree in
its favor, that court would do well to hold that the decree should not be recognized, as Pennsylvania was attempting to escheat to itself property not within its
jurisdiction.

Constitutional Law-Abolition of Actions for Breach of Contract to
Marry-.The New York legislature passed a statute abolishing actions for
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of promise
to marry." Plaintiff subsequently sued for breach of promise to marry. Held,
for defendant on the ground that the statute was constitutional, because the legislature not only has the power to regulate marriage and all that pertains thereto,
but also to correct abuses and deficiencies in the common law. Fearon v.
Treanor,288 N. Y. Supp. 368 (App. Div., ist Dep't 1936).
A suit was brought for criminal conversation and alienation of affections.
Held, recovery allowed because the statute was unconstitutional, as a common
law cause of action cannot be abolished without the substitution of another remedy to protect the interest safeguarded previously by the discarded procedure.
Hanfgarn v. Mark, 289 N. Y. Supp. 143 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1936).
In view of the manifest abuse of these actions, 2 and the controversial status
of the legislative power to abolish common law remedies,3 the Fearon decision
appears preferable to that in Hanfgarn v. Mark. Furthermore, in the Hanfgarn
case the court went to unnecessary lengths to nullify the effect of the statute,
failing to recognize that at common law a woman could not recover from her
seducer, 4 nor a wife from her husband's mistress, 5 and therefore, as these causes
of action are statutory and can be abolished s the entire statute should not have
been invalidated. And indeed, even that part of the decision in Hanfgarn v.
Mark which affected breach of promise is not wholly uncontrovertible. The
common law was adopted by the states and there appears to be no reason why it
cannot be supplanted or abolished by exercise of the same power.7 No vested
x. N. Y. Crv. PRAcT. AcT (Cahill, Supp. 1936) §§ 61a-6ri. Similar statutes have been
passed or are pending in many other states; see Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart
Balm" (1935) 33 MicH. L. Rzv. 979. The Pennsylvania statute is almost identical, save for
the omission of the actions for seduction and criminal conversation. PA. STAT. ANI. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 48, § I71.
2. For a thorough discussion see Brown, Breach of Promise Suits (i929) 77 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 474; Notes (I935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. IO4, (935) 22 VA. L. REV. 205.
3. See Silver v. Silver, 28o U. S. i1,

122 (i929) : ".

.

.

the Constitution does not for-

bid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by common law, to
attain a permissable legislative object." But see Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 332
(I933) to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the preservation of the substantial right to redress by some effective procedure. The case closest to the present situation seems to be Sharp v. Producers' Produce Co., 226 Mo. App. i89, 47 S. W. (2d) 242
(1932) which held that the legislature had the power to take away the common law rights

and remedies of the husband with regard to the wife's services.
4. Colly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N. Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
5. See Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. i56, 159, 14o N. E. 227, 228 (1923). Contra:
Bennett v. Bennett, ii6 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
6. Robinson v. McHugh, i58 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (i93o) ; see Relyea v. Tomahawk
Pulp & Paper Co., 102 Wis. 301, 304, 78 N. W. 412, 413 (1899).

7. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 4o6, 417 (9IO).
In cases involving the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the abolition of common law defenses
has been upheld. N. Y. Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917). If the legislature has

the power to abolish defenses to a cause of action not yet accrued, it should be able, also, to
remove the remedy given by the suit.
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interests are here involved," and the subject is peculiarly under legislative control." Moreover, while some hardship may be worked by prohibition of these
actions, the steps taken by the legislature seem neither arbitrary nor unreasonable
with relation to the public needs, for the extent to which these actions have benefited the unscrupulous cannot fail to be noticed.' 0 The truly injured person is
the last to consider bringing an action for breach of contract to marry; and the
other actions have like unsavory reputations. Surely, therefore, in such a situation the legislature should be permitted to seek the only effective remedy, that
embodied in this statute," and especially when the legal reasons assigned by the
court which held the statute unconstitutional are so subject to criticism.

Constitutional Law-Federal Statute Permitting Insolvent Political
Subdivisions to Readjust Their Obligations Unconstitutional-Under the
Sumners Act,' which amended the Bankruptcy Act 2 to permit insolvent political
subdivisions of any state to file a petition in a federal court for a readjustment
*of their debts, an irrigation district created by a Texas statute 3 filed a petition,
alleging its inability to meet its obligations. Contestants, owners of petitioner's
bonds, intervened. Thereafter, the Texas legislature passed an act 4 granting the
approval of the state required by the Sumners Act.5 Held (four justices dissenting),6 that the Sumners Act was unconstitutional, because the power of Congress
to enact bankruptcy legislation 7 could not be used to interfere with the sovereignty of the states in respect to their fiscal policies, and secondly, that the state
statute was an "indirect" violation of the constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts. 8 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement DistrictNo. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892 (1936), rehearingdenied, 4 U. S. L. Week
146.
The Supreme Court, like the district court before it," relied upon cases defining the limits of the taxing power, which had invalidated the federal taxation of
state governmental instrumentalities. That these decisions were inapplicable,
since the only petitions authorized by the Sumners Act were voluntary ones, has
8. A distinction is generally made between "vested" and "not vested" rights of action.
The right is said not to vest until a wrong has occurred, and it is probable that confusion has
resulted from the failure to distinguish between the two interests. There is, of course, a
stronger argument that the constitutional guaranties invoked here should apply to rights of
action already accrued.
9. The marriage contract has been held to be of such a nature that it can be impaired by
a state without encountering constitutional objections. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. i9o
(1888). A contract to marry is surely of like nature and importance, and the other situations
are of as great concern to the powers that regulate domestic life.
io. See O'Brien v. Manning, ioi Misc. 123, i66 N. Y. Supp. 76o (Sup. Ct. 1917), a
breach of promise case wherein plaintiff admittedly had no love for defendant, who was fiftyfive years older.
ii. A discussion of possible remedies, of which the one disputed here alone appears
efficacious, is found in Brown, supra note 2, at 495.
1. 48 STAT. 798, 11 U. S. C. A. §§,3o1-3o3 (Supp. 1934).
2. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), II U. S. C. A. §§ i et seq. (I927).
3. TEx. ComP. STAT. (1928)

4. Tex. Laws 1935, c. 107.

§§ 7622-7807.

5. 48 STAT. 8o02 (k), ii U. S. C. A. § 303 (k) (Supp. 1934).
6. Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone
7. U. S. CoNsT. Art. i, § 8, cl. 4.
8. U. S. CoNsT. Art. i, § io, cl. i.
9. In re Cameron County Water Improvement District No. i, 9 F. Supp. io3 (S. D.
Tex. 1934).
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been pointed out by lower courts 10 and in previous issues of this IEVIEW.1 1 The
majority opinion avoided this question by anticipating a problem not involved
here, declaring that if voluntary petitions could be entertained, so might involuntary ones.- 2 Moreover, the argument that the state statute impaired the obligation of contracts is specious. The impairment, if any, is done by the federal
statute; the state's role is only passive.'3 And finally, it seems inconsistent to
complain that the federal government was meddling excessively in the state's
4
affairs, while simultaneously contending that the state's act was responsible.1

Constitutional Law-Invalidity of Statute Authorizing Election of
Equal Number of Men and Women to Political Party's State Committee
When Desired by Committee-In pursuance of a statute authorizing a
political party's state committee to provide for the election of an equal number of
men and women to the committee, if it so desired,' the form of the Democratic
primary ballot of New York compelled voters to vote for one male and one female
representative on the state committee. The petitioner, whose name appeared on
the primary ballot, asked to have the election of the man and woman who had
received a majority of the votes cast declared void. Held, the election was void
because the statute violated both the Federal and State Constitutions. In re Cavellier, 287 N. Y. Supp. 739 (Sup. Ct. 1926).

The court did not assert specifically what articles of the Constitutions were
offended by this statute, and referred only to the Nineteenth Amendment. However, that Amendment applies merely to those doing the voting and not those to
be voted for 2 and therefore this statute did not seem to contravene it. In Nixon
v. Condon,3 the only case at all analogous to this, the United States Supreme
Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment

4

was violated when the Texas state

Democratic committee, authorized by a statute empowering it to do so, excluded
negroes from participation in the primaries, on the ground that the committee
acted as an agent of the state, and that therefore, state action of an arbitrary
nature was involved. But even if the statute in the instant case be considered as
similar in that it is really the state, and not the committee alone, which made the
restrictions, it should not be unconstitutional, as this action does not seem to deny
the equal protection of the laws. Doubtless, the intention of the New York legislature was to enable the party committee to interest the women of the state in
politics by giving them a voice in party management. Furthermore, any man and
woman were eligible for election, so that no person was discriminated against, as
were the negroes in Nixon v. Condon.
xo. In re East Contra Costa Irrigation District, io F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal.
In re Imperial Irrigation District, io F. Supp. 832 (S. D. Cal. 1935) ; cf. Cameron
Water Improvement District No. i v. Ashton, 81 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
I1. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 920; 84 id. io2.
12. "If voluntary proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary ones . . . ."
case at 895.
r3. See In re Imperial Irrigation District, io F. Supp. 832, 841 (S. D. Cal.
Legis. (935) 35 Cor- L. Rav. 428, 437.
14. See (1936) 6 BRoo LYN L. REv. 2o2, io4.

1935)
County
Instant
1935);

i. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. r6, § ixi.
2. The Amendment reads: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." (Italics
added.)
3. 286 U. S. 73 (932).

4. The court based its decision on the equal protection clause. U. S. CoNsT., Amend.
XIV.
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Constitutional Law-Maximum Hour Legislation-Invalidity of Ordinances Regulating Hours of Delivery of Bakeries and Laundries and Hours
of Operation for Groceries-A municipal ordinance of Oakland prohibited
the delivery of bakery goods on certain holidays, and between the hours of
6 P. M. and 6:3o A. M. on other days.' Plaintiff bakers sought an injunction
restraining enforcement of this ordinance, contending that their businesses
would otherwise be destroyed, because most deliveries had to be made during
early morning hours.
A second ordinance, similar in its terms, applied to laundries. 2 Petitioner
was convicted of operating his laundry after 6 P. M., and sought his release on
a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that, as both ordinances were void under the
Federal 3 and California 4 Constitutions, the injunction [Skaggs v. Oakland, 57
P. (2d) 478 (Cal. 1936)] and the writ [Ex parte Mark, 58 P. (2d) 913 (Cal.
1936) ] should be granted.
Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin enforcement of a Toledo ordinance
which prohibited the operation of retail food and grocery stores except between
the hours of 7 A. M. and 7:30 P. M. on weekdays, and from 7 A. M. to 9 P. M.
on Saturdays and on days preceding holidays. 5 Held, that the injunction should
be granted, as the ordinance was in contravention of the "due process" clauses
of the Federal 6 and Ohio 7 Constitutions. Olds v. Klots, 3 N. E. (2d) 371
(Ohio 1936).
Although the constitutionality of legislation regulating the hours of labor
has been generally upheld,8 similar statutes with regard to the hours of business
operations have met with a less favorable judicial reception. 9 Courts, in validating the former, have stated that those laws were reasonably designed to promote
and safeguard the public health, taking this position first with regard to women
and children,10 on the ground that such acts prevented the undermining of health,
and thus were essential to the welfare of future generations. Their scope was
later expanded to include the protection of men."1 However, when courts have
considered legislation limiting hours of business operations, it generally has been
held constitutional only when the regulation had a direct connection with the
public safety, as when the hours of washing and ironing in laundries have been
limited to prevent fire risks,'12 or pawnshops have been required to remain closed
during the night to prevent thieves from disposing of stolen goods before the
police were notified.-8 On the other hand, when closing hour regulations for
i. Cited in Skaggs v. Oakland, 57 P. (2d) 478, 479 (Cal. 1936).
Cited in Ex parte Mark, 58 P. (2d) 913, 914 (Cal. 1936).

2.

3. U. S. Coi'sT. Amend. XIV.
4. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 13.

5. Cited in Olds v. Klotz, 3 N. E. (2d) 371, 372 (Ohio, 1936).
6. U. S. CosT. Amend. XIV.
7. OHIO Co NT. art. I, § 16.
8. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898); Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412 (19o8);
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671 (1914); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 (1915);
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917). Contra: In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 Pac. io71
(i899) ; State v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204 (933).
9. Ex parte Harrell, 76 Fla. 4, 79 So. 166 (1918) (stores selling general merchandise) ;
State ex rel. Pavlik v. Johannes, 194 Minn. 10, 259 N. W. 537 (1935) (barber shops);
Cowan v. Buffalo, 288 N. Y. SuPP. 239 (1936) (open air markets).
io. See cases collected in Note (1934) 9o A. L. R. 815.
ii. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (I898).
12. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885).
13. Hyman v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369 (1913).

In cases of such regula-

tions over barber shops, there have been mixed results. Some courts have held that these
rules have no relation to sanitation, etc., as in State ex rel. Pavlik v. Johannes, 194 Minn.
10, 259 N. W. 537 (1935), whereas it was held that such a law was reasonable because it
prevented barber shops from becoming blinds for criminal breeding places in Wilson v.
Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, igg N. E. 187 (1935). Compare In re Saranimo, 4 U. S. L.
WEaic 14 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1936).
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open air markets and stores selling general merchandise have been contested,
the tendency has been to declare them invalid, as having no relation to the public
health or safety. 14 The occupations regulated by the instant ordinances, being
ordinary mercantile pursuits, are more nearly analogous to the latter group than
to the former, in which hour statutes have been sustained as health and safety
measures. Therefore, the present decisions do not lack the support of precedent.
However, the "Blue Laws", the constitutionality of which has never been seriously doubted, 15 do afford a basis for a contrary result. And moreover, such
a result would have been more desirable, for the statutes here involved do not
seem unreasonable, however inexpedient they may have been.'6

Constitutional Law-Obligation of Contracts Impaired by Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act of 1934-The Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act,' declaring the existence of an emergency, provided that whenever the amount realized from the sale of mortgaged realty on a
foreclosure was "insufficient to satisfy the debt, interest and costs, the plaintiff
. . . shall, within six months after such sale, petition the court . . . to fix the

fair value of the property sold." Should the "fair value" exceed the sale price, a
deficiency judgment was to be entered for only the difference between such "fair
value" and the amount of the judgment, interest and costs. The act was to be
effective only from January, 1934 to July, 1935. Plaintiff mortgagee, having
failed to petition the court within the statutory period to fix the "fair value" of
the mortgaged premises which had been sold, defendant mortgagor, in accordance
with the provisions of the act, had the judgment marked satisfied. The plaintiff
petitioned the court to grant a rule on the defendants to show cause why the satisfaction should not be stricken from the record. Held (Barnes, J., dissenting),
that the petition should be granted and the rule made absolute, on the ground that
the act violated the federal and state constitutional restrictions against impairing
the obligation of contracts. 2 Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich,
Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 7, P. 7,Oct. 8, p. 4 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1936).
In invalidating the act, the court resorted to the familiar but obscure distinction between laws which operate on substantive rights of parties to a contract
and those which merely affect or modify the remedies given to enforce those
rights," it being well settled that only laws of the former type "impair the obligation of contracts." 4 However, such a distinction becomes tenuous when one
examines the contradictory precedents, 5 and realizes that any statutory modifica14. Ex parte Harrell, 76 Fla. 4, 79 So. i66 (1918) ; Cowan v. Buffalo, 157 Misc. 71,
282 N. Y. Supp. 88o (Sup. Ct. 1935).
15. See Bisnar, The Constitutionality of Blue Sunday Laws (1932) 1i PHILiPpixE L.
3. 229, 232-244.
16. The ordinances invalidated here may have been intended to lessen noise during the
night, to prevent overwork on the part of independent grocers unable to employ clerks in
the evening, to prevent contamination of bread left on doorsteps for several hours, etc.

i. PA. STAT. ANw. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 21, § 8o6. The Act provides that the
court, sitting without a jury, may hear the petition or refer it to a master.
2. U. S. CoxCsT. Art. i, § iO; PA. ConsT. art. I, § 17.
3. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 200 (U. S. i8ig); Von Hoffman v. City
of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 553-554 (U. S. 1866); Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HAIv. L. REv. io6i, io69.
4. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819); Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How.
461 (U. S. i86o); Bunn, The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurace Moratoria (1933) 1 U. OF CH. L. REv. 241, 251.
5.See Feller, supra note 3, at 1O7T.
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tion of the remedy must, at least to some extent, impair substantive rights. 6
Furthermore, any change in remedy, enacted as a relief measure, which does not
really alter the debtor's obligation, albeit slightly, fails of its purpose. But in
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,7 the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the rule that, since all contracts are subject to the implied reservation
of the protective power of the state over its citizens, state legislation, although it
may affect substantive rights, does not impair contract obligations within the
meaning of the constitutional restriction if it is reasonable when judged by the
circumstances occasioning its enactment." And it would appear that the Pennsylvania act met this requirement. Under ordinary economic conditions, the
foreclosure sale was considered the fairest method of determining the value of
the mortgaged premises. But the lack of competitive bidding at foreclosure
sales, due to the depression and the glutting of the realty market, enabled the
mortgagee to acquire the property at a purely nominal figure, together with a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor personally for virtually the entire
original mortgage indebtedness. 10 To remedy this situation the legislature, as a
temporary measure of relief, aimed to secure a more equitable procedure for
determining the value of the realty by adopting a method which had sometimes
been used by courts of equity under similar conditions." In the light of such
circumstances, the act would appear to have been "reasonable" within the rule
invoked in the Blaisdell case, and therefore" constitutional.' 2

Constitutional Law-Taxation-Statute Creating Boards Empowered
to Compromise Current Taxes Void-A statute created county delinquent
tax adjustment boards with power to corhpromise or adjust, in accordance with
their own discretion, the amounts required to be-paid for the redemption or pur6. Note (1933)

42 YALE L. J. 1236, 124o.
see Corwin, Moratorium over Minnesota (1934) 82 U.

7. 290 U. S. 398 (1934) ;

OF PA.

L. REv. 311.

8. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 29 U. S. 398, 434-43"7 (1934). "The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to that end." Id. at 438. See also Sliosberg v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 497, 155 N. E. 749, 756 (927); Block v. Hirsh, 256
U. S. 135 (192i); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921).
9. See Baader v. Mascellino, 113 N. J. Eq. i8g, 192, 166 Atl. 466, 467 (1933) ; Suring
State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 491, 246 N. W. 556, 557 (1933) ; Note (i935) 84 U. OF
PA. L. RFv. 223, 225; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 538, 544.
io. Note (I935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 223, 225.
ii. Although it has generally been held that mere inadequacy of price is insufficient
to justify refusal to confirm the sale [Baldwin v. Brown, 193 Cal. 345, 224 Pac. 462 (1924) ;
Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 6i S. W. (2d) 686 (933)], many courts have been
ingenious in finding some additional fictional irregularity to enable them to refuse confirmation. See New Jersey Nat. Bank v. Savemore Realty Corp., 1o7 N. J. Eq. 478, 153 At. 48o
(i931), Lefever v. Kline, 294 Pa. 22, 143 Atl. 488 (1928).
And recently, some courts, taking cognizance of the depressed realty market, have refused confirmation unless the mortgagee agreed to credit the mortgage indebtedness with the fair value of the property. Suring State Bank v. Giese, 2IO Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556 (1933), 81 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 883;
Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Atl. 538

(1933).

12. Although statutes similar to the one in the instant case have been held unconstitutional, they were not grounded upon an emergency. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 6o8
(U. S. 1844) ; Gantly's Lessee v. Ewing, 3 How. 707 (U. S. 1845). The New York statute,
enacted as emergency legislation, and virtually the same as Pennsylvania's, was upheld in
Klinke v. Samuels, 164 N. Y. a44, i9o N. E. 324 (1934).
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chase of tax sale certificates including "omitted subsequent taxes",1 which the
court construed to mean unpaid current taxes. One of these boards appealed
from an injunction restraining it from proceeding under the statute. Held (two
justices dissenting), that the provisions of the act which purported to empower
the boards to compromise current unpaid taxes were unconstitutional because
they violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.2 Richey v.
Wells, 166 So. 817 (Fla. 1936).
This statute represents one of the many legislative efforts to alleviate the
chaotic situation produced by the recent increase in tax delinquencies in our
southern and western states,8 but differs from the bulk of such legislation, which
has been upheld on the ground that it was merely designed to dispose of state
property, 4 by attempting to provide for compromises of the amounts due from
delinquent taxpayers on property which did not yet have a judgment against it.
The few recent decisions on statutes of this precise nature have held such legislation to be a denial to prompt taxpayers of the equal protection of the laws, 5 for,
as the concessions offered were not available to those who already had paid their
taxes, there was an unreasonable discrimination against the prompt taxpayer.6
Thus it would seem, as this court pointed out,7 that legislation of this type might
well be constitutional if it were to provide rebates to those who had already paid
their taxes. Another alternative, suggested by the Minnesota court, 8 would be a
provision for reductions predicated upon actual land values and investigations of
the individual taxpayer's ability to pay, which would prevent an unfair favoring
of laggard taxpayers as a class. However, forceful arguments have been
advanced in a few minority opinions for statutes such as that involved here."
These opinions stressed the need for clearing up delinquent taxes, and argued
that such legislation should not be considered as tax laws, but rather as attempts
to settle bad debts and that, for reasons of expediency, the compromisory provisions should be allowed. Of course, on the other hand, there is the possibility
of encouraging future delinquencies, which seriously detracts from any advantage to be gained by temporarily clarifying the present confusion. 10 But, regardless of one's opinion as to the desirability of such a classification under the circumstances, its reasonableness is certainly moot and, therefore it is to be regretted that the court felt compelled to declare the instant provision a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
i. Fla. Laws (1935) c. I74O6.
2. A second ground for the decision was that the statute unconstitutionally delegated
legislative power, as no definite standards were set up for the exercise of discretion by the
board.

3. For a discussion of the effects of the recent increase in tax deliquencies see Simpson,
Tax Deliquency--Economic Aspects (1933) 28 ILL. L. REV. 147.
4. For a compilation of these cases, together with an enumeration of the various devices
which have been held constitutional, see (1935) 33 MicH. L. REV. 128o.
5. City of Marianna v. Davis, 169 So. 5o (Fla. 1936) ; State ex reL. Matteson v. Luecke,
194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206 (935).
Accord: Simpson v. Warren, io6 Fla. 688, 143 So.
602 (1932). Compare Vance Lumber Co. v. King County, 184 Wash. 402, 407, 5I P. (2d)
623, 625 (1935), in which the majority refused to consider the constitutionality of a similar
statute on the ground that the question was not raised by the proper complainant.
6. Thus the legislation also violates the provision contained in practically every state constitution requiring uniformity of tax laws. State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246,
260 N. W.
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(1935).

7. Instant case at 829.
8. See State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 253, 26o N. W. 2o6, 209 (1935).
9. City of Marianna v. Davis, 169 So. 5o, 52 (Fla. 1936) ; State ex reL. Matteson v.
Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 253, 26o N. W. 2o6, 209 (1935).
zo. Note (1934) i8 MixN. L. REv. 849; (935) 33 MIcH. L. R-v. 1:28o.
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Constitutional Law-Washington State Minimum Wage Law for
Women Valid Exercise of Police Power-A state statute provided for the
creation of an "Industrial Welfare Commission" to establish ". . . such standards of wages . . . for women . . . as shall be held hereunder to be reasonable and not detrimental to health and morals." 1 Plaintiff, a woman, sued to
recover the difference between the wage actually paid her, and that which the
commission had decreed should be paid her. Defendant contended that the
statute was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Held, that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
Parrishv. West Coast Hotel Co., 55 P. (2d) lO83 (Wash. 1936), cert. granted,
4 U. S. L. WEEK 121.
Prior to the case of Adkins v. Children'sHospital 2 most courts had upheld
minimum wage legislation as a constitutional exercise of the police power,3 but
that decision by the United States Supreme Court caused a reversal of the
trend: The state of Washington, however, refused to be bound by the Adkins
case, stating it was "not controlling", 5 and instead adhered to an darlier decision
of its own holding minimum wage laws constitutional. 6 Whether the instant
statute will be invalidated by the Supreme Court is doubtful. Despite the
vigorous language of the Supreme Court in declaring a similar New York
statute 7 unconstitutional,8 two features of their opinion are worthy of note.
First, they seemed to be aware that they were opposing a definite trend toward
the regulation of labor by government, 9 and therefore expressly confined themselves to a consideration of the petitioner's attempt to distinguish between the
congressional statute involved in Adkins v. Children's Hospital and the New
York statute.' 0 Secondly, the holding was based upon the "construction" of
the New York statute by the state court of appeals, which construction precluded
the possibility of finding any distinction between the congressional and the New
York legislation. Therefore, the instant case furnishes an excellent opportunity
for advocates of minimum wage legislation to secure favorable adjudication by
the Supreme Court. And such a decision would be entirely warranted, for in
view of the large number of legislatures which have passed such legislation,".
1. 8 WAsH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 193) tit. 5o, § 7624Y2.
2. 261 U. S. 525 (923), criticized in 71 U. OF PA. L. REV. 360. This case held uncon-

stitutional a federal minimum wage law for women in the District of Columbia.
3. Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (914), aff'd, 243 U. S. 629 (1917)
(the Court divided four to four, Mr. Justice Brandeis not voting because he had appeared
as counsel in a similar case) ; State v. Crowe, 13o Ark. 272, 197 S.W. 4 (1917) ; Williams
v. Evans, 139 Minn. 32, z65 N. W. 496 (1917); Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash.
359, 194 Pac. 595 (1920).
4. Folding Furniture Co. v. Ind. Comm., 300 Fed. 991 (W. D. Wis. 1924); Topeka Laundry Co. v. Court of Ind. Rel., i9 Kans. 12, 237 Pac. 1041 (1925); People v.

Successors of Laumaga & Co., 32 Porto Rico 766 (1924).
5. Instant case at 1O9o.

6. Larsen v. Rice, 1oo Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918).
7. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, Supp. 1935) c. 32, §§ 550-567.

8. Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936), pet. for rehearing denied, 4 U. S. L. WEE
I21; see (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 613.
9. See Harper, Due Process of Law in State and Labor Legislation (1928) 26 MICH.
L. REv. 599, 763, 888.
io. Petitioner attempted to distinguish between the two statutes by pointing out that
the District of Columbia statute forced the employer to pay the minimum wage without regard to the worth of the employee's labor, whereas the New York statute provided for
payment of this wage only if the Industrial Commission decided, after an impartial hearing,
that the employee was worth at least the minimum wage decreed to be paid her. The
Supreme Court did not accept this distinction since the New York Court of Appeals had
"construed" the statute to mean a minimum wage regardless of worth. For a discussion of
this point see, Note (1936) 34 MICH.L. REv. ii8o.
II. Seventeen state legislatures have enacted minimum wage legislation. Minimum
Wage Laws (1936) 26 Am. LAB. LEG. REv. 84.
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it would be difficult to regard it as unreasonable. Nor does it seem to impose
arbitrary restraints upon the employer. 12 Moreover, if the Court permits any
restrictions upon the freedom of contract, which it certainly has,"' there is no
reason why wages should be held sacrosanct. 14 Insufficient income is as detrimental to the health of a woman as long hours of work, and should be as proper
a subject for regulation as the latter.1 5 Furthermore, wages are but the price
of a commodity which is sold to employers, and the labor and health of women
are easily as essential to the welfare of a state as is milk. Therefore, if the
dairy industry may be protected by minimum price laws," the states should be
permitted to extend similar aid to the far more helpless women workers.

Corporations-Legality of the Practice of Optometry by CorporationsThe defendant corporation, which conducted an optometrical department advertised in the name of the corporation, employed a registered optometrist, supplied him with instruments, and paid him a regular salary, plus commission.
The State Board of Examiners in Optometry sought to enjoin the defendant
from the alleged practice of optometry, contending that such practice by a corporation was illegal under the Maryland statute regulating optometry.1 Held,
that the defendant was not engaged in "practicing optometry" in violation of
the statute. Dvorine v. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 185 Atl. 562 (Md. 1936).
In recent years, with the expansion of department stores and jewelry companies into the sale of optical goods, the question of the power of a corporation
to engage in the calling of optometry has been frequently litigated. A slight
majority of cases have held, in situations similar to that involved here, that the
corporations, as well as the optometrists employed by them, were engaged in the
practice of optometry, and that such practice was illegal, as the corporation
could not satisfy the statutory regulations regarding age, training, examinations,
etc. 2 However, although the view upon which those cases were based, namely
12. "Due process of law" should be satisfied by the thorough manner in which the Industrial Commission is compelled to investigate the industry before establishing a minimum
wage. The hearings, regulations, and reasons for the regulation are then given adequate
publicity. 8 WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1931) tit. 50, §§7625-7639.
13. Feedom of contract has long ceased to exist in its absolute sense. Usury laws, Sunday laws, labor laws, and insurance laws are but a few of the commonest qualifications of
this right.
14. Other interferences with freedom to contract for wages have been upheld in the
following cases: Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 19o U. S. i69 (1903); McLean v. Arkansas,
211 U. S. 539 (i9o9) ; Erie R. R. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (I914) ; Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U. S. 426 (1916); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 25r

(1931).

i5. The regulation of hours often has been upheld. Sturges v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S.
(914) ; Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 67i (914) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373
(1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U. S. 385 (915); Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg.
Co., 120 Mass. 383 (1876) ; People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395 (915).
Cf. State
v. Henry, 37 N. M. 536, 25 P. (2d) 204 (1933). See (1936) 85 U. or PA. L. REv. 113.
16. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 5o2 (1934), 82 U. or PA. L. REV. 619; Borden's
32o

Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. 594 (936),

84 U. or PA. L. REv. 786; Gold31 ILL. L. REv. 179.

smith and Winkle, Price Fixing: From Nebbia to Guffey (1936)
i. i MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 43, § 315.
2. The following cases arose on mandamus proceedings

to compel the issuance of a corporate charter: Teseschi v. Mathis, 116 N. J. Law 187, 183 Atl. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Stern v. Flynn, 154 N. Y. Misc. 6o9, 278 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1935). Contra: Dickson v. Flynn, 286 N. Y. Supp. 226 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1936). The following cases were
prosecutions against already existing corporations: Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel. LaPrade, 5o P. (2d) 945 (Ariz. 1935) ; State v. Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W.
332 (i933) ; State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P. (2d) 995

RECENT CASES

that optometry is a learned profession and that sound public policy forbids its
"commercialization", is supported by some authority, a proper analysis, such as
that in this and the few companion cases representing the minority rule, shows
the fallacy of that contention by pointing out that optometry is a mechanical
art, and empirical rather than learned. 4 The work of the optometrist stops short
of using drugs, or of treating the eye itself for either injuries or diseases.
These are the functions of the physician, the surgeon, the oculist, and the
ophthalmologist. Furthermore, that type of confidential relationship that exists
between a lawyer and his client in the practice of law does not exist in the
practice of optometry." The present decision is undoubtedly correct if the purpose of the statutes is considered as the safeguarding of public health, rather
than the protection of the economic position of individual optometrists, for a
corporation which employs the services of a qualified and registered optometrist
for persons desiring eye correction does not seem to constitute any special danger
to public health." And indeed, the constitutionality of a statute which so prohibits corporations from engaging in the calling of optometry might be questioned on the theory of Liggett Co. v. Baldrige,7 which held that a similar restriction upon corporations deprived them of their property without due process
of law.8 On the whole, therefore, the courts which have yet to decide this point
might well follow the instant decision, which appears better to interpret -the
legislative intent, and to be not undesirable, and which avoids the gin of unconstitutionality.

Crimes-Lotteries-Consideration Necessary to Constitute a LotteryThe plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation by the defendants of "bank nights"
in conjunction with the operation of their theatres, contending that such schemes
violated the lottery statutes.' In one case, chances could be obtained in the
(1935); Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 V. Va. 776, 178 S. E. 695 (1934).
Contra:
Jaeckle v. L. Bamberger & Co., 119 N. J. Eq. 126, I8I Atl. I8I (Gh. 1935), aff'd, 184 Atl.
46 (N. J. 1936).
3. State v. Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W. 332- (1933) ; State ex rel.
Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P. (2d) 995 (1935); Stern v. Flynn, 154
N. Y. Misc. 6og, 278 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115
W. Va. 776, 178 S. E. 695 (934).
4. Instant case at p. 556: ". . . it is essentially a mechanical art which requires skill,
manual dexterity and a knowledge of the use and application of certain mechanical instruments . . . rather than the knowledge and learning appropriate to professions or callings
which deal with causes and conduct rather than with conditions and effects." The statute
defined optometry as the "employment of any means, except the use of drugs, medicine or
surgery . . . for the purpose of . . . prescribing by any means of lens for any optical
condition . . . ." I MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 43, § 315.

5. For the expression of a contrary view, see Stern v. Flynn, 154 N. Y. Misc. 6og, 614,
278 N. Y. Supp. 598, 6o2 (Sup. Ct. 1935), which view is criticised in Dickson v. Flynn, 286
N. Y. Supp. 226, 229-231 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1936).
6. In Jaeckle v. L. Bamberger & Co., 11g N. J.Eq. 126, 130, 181 Ati. 181, 182 (Ch.
1935), aff'd, 184 Atl. 46 (N. J. 1936), the court said: "The statutory scheme protects the
public by requiring those who actually examine eyes to be properly qualified. It is immaterial whether they practice on their own behalf or whether they are employed by other
optometrists, or by persons not skilled in the art, or by corporations."
7. 278 U. S. lO5 (1928), in which a Pennsylvania statute providing that every pharmacy or drugstore shall be owned only by a licensed pharmacist, and in case of corporations, associations and copartnerships, requiring that all partners or members thereof shall
be licensed pharmacists, was declared to be unconstitutional as in contravention of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. See Dickson v. Flynn, 286 N. Y. Supp. 226, 229 (App. Div., 3d Dep't 1936).
i.MicH. ComP. LAWS (1929)
§§9324, 9325, 11275, 11302.

§§ x6613, 16614; TENN.

CODE ANN.

(Michie, 1932)
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theatre lobby, without purchasing admission, and the winners were announced
outside the theatre. Held, for defendants, as the element of consideration necessary to support a lottery was absent. State v. Crescent Amusement Co., 95
S. W. (2d) 310 (Tenn. 1936).
In the second case, chances could be obtained only by paying the price of
admission. Held, that the injunction should be granted, as the money paid for
admission furnished the consideration essential to a lottery. Sproat-Temple
Theatre v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise,267 N. W. 602 (Mich. 1936).
The recent litigation concerning the legality of "bank nights" under the lottery laws has revolved primarily about the element of consideration. As was
pointed out in a recent issue of the REVIEW, 2 which discussed this problem at
greater length, "bank nights" generally will be held lotteries only when some
pecuniary consideration must be given for chances. On the other hand, as the
instant cases clearly show, the benefits derived from the advertising and the likelihood that few persons would be bold enough to request a chance without buying
a ticket of admission will not bring these schemes within the ban of the statutes,
in the absence of a monetary consideration.

Divorce-Waiver of the Power of Estoppel Against Party Denying the
Validity of a Foreign Decree of Divorce-Plaintiff sued for a separation. In
his defense, the defendant admitted the marriage but alleged that he had left the
plaintiff because of her adultery, and counterclaimed for an absolute divorce.
The counterclaim was dismissed on the ground that the defendant, having obtained a divorce in Nevada, was bound by his act and would not be heard to deny
the foreign court's power to dissolve the marriage, although the divorce was void
in New York. On appeal, held (by a three to two decision), that the order dismissing the counterclaim was erroneous, because the plaintiff, having treated the
decree as void, had waived her power to estop the defendant from pleading his
counterclaim. Stevens v. Stevens, 288 N. Y. Supp. 785 (App. Div., 2d Dep't
1936).1
Although a party who has obtained a foreign decree of divorce is under a
disability to impeach the decree or to deny its validity, 2 the one who was the
2.

(1936) 84 U.

OF PA.

L. REV. go6.

x. Compare Shannon v. Shannon, 286 N. Y. Supp. 27 (2d Dep't 1936), in which the
same result was reached as that in the instant case, but in which the court did not base its
decision on a waiver of the power of estoppel. There, both plaintiff and defendant, appearing by attorneys, mutually petitioned a Mexican court for a divorce, which was granted,
but which was wholly void in New York. Subsequently, the defendant remarried. Plaintiff sought an adjudication of divorce, basing his action on the adultery incident to his
wife's subsequent "remarriage." Plaintiff was denied judgment in -the lower court, on the
theory that his claim involved an attack by him on the validity of a prior foreign decree of
divorce. Upon appeal, this was held error by a three to two decision, the court saying, "The
relief which plaintiff seeks in this action is not inconsistent with his position in the void
Mexican proceeding. His procedure herein involves no attack on the prior invalid decree.
He seeks no advantage from the Mexican proceedings based on a position contradictory to
his acts in that proceedings, nothing to the disadvantage of the wife or her estate; therefore he is not estopped to seek a dissolution of the marriage status . . . ." But it is clear
that the husband did act inconsistently with his former position, for by alleging his wife's
adultery, he denied the validity of the Mexican decree. However, as in the Stevens case,
the court's decision was equitable, for neither party was enabled to take advantage of a
status denied to the other. See (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1292.
2. Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (io3); Brown v. Brown, 242
App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 532, x95 N. E. 186
(1935) ; McDonald's Estate, 268 Pa. 486, 112 Atl. 98 (192o) ; cf. Shannon v. Shannon, 286
N. Y. Supp. e7, 28 (2d Dep't 1936).
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respondent in the foreign suit should be able, by analogy with the application of
the doctrine of estoppel in other types of cases," to waive, either expressly or
impliedly, the power of enforcing the disability. But the ground upon which the
instant court held that the plaintiff waived her power of estoppel is novel. The
court was of the opinion that the plaintiff had impliedly waived her power of
preventing the defendant from pleading his counterclaim by instituting a separation action, and thus treating the prior divorce as void. The dissenting judges,
however, thought that the plaintiff had not waived the power, since the Nevada
decree was void, and she was entitled to so regard it. The majority said, in effect,
that the plaintiff had waived her power of estoppel by doing something inconsistent with the former foreign decree of divorce, that is, by bringing a suit for a
separation. Heretofore, when the party holding the power of estoppel had
done some act consistent with the former foreign decree, he was held to be under
a disability to deny the validity of the decree. 4 Thus, courts have decided that a
remarriage of the respondent in the former divorce proceedings, 5 voluntary
appearance to the foreign suit for divorce, 6 or the acceptance of alimony 7 causes
a waiver of the power of estoppel. But these courts did not specifically mention the principle of waiver, although it was probably the basis for their decisions.,
However, the doctrine of estoppel being equitable in nature,9 the instant decision
was satisfactory, for otherwise the plaintiff would have been able to take advantage of a marital status, whereas the defendant would have been unable to allege
it in order to establish his wife's adultery.

Taxation-Corporations-Ad Valorem State Tax Upon Intangible Property of Foreign Corporation Acquiring a Business Situs-A steel corporation, chartered in Delaware, maintained plants and sales offices in various states,
but its general business office was in West Virginia, where the "management
functioned", approved all contracts and controlled the receipt, expenditure and
deposit of all moneys. West Virginia levied an ad valorem tax on corporate
bank deposits and accounts receivable.- The corporation appealed from the
3. Davis v. Brinkhouse Hotel Co., 74 Colo. i99, 219 Pac. 1074 (1923); Schwab v.
Brotherhood of American Yoemen, 305 Mo. j48, 264 S. W. 69o (924); People ex ret. Jannicky v. Warden of City Prison, 231 App. Div. 13r, 137, 246 N. Y. Supp. 195, 2O (2d Dep't
i93o) ; Richmond Leather Mfg. Co. v. Fawcett, 130 Va. 484, so6, io7 S. E. 8oo, 8o8 (i91).
4. Arthur v. Israel, i5 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 81 (890) ; Parmelee v. Hutchins, 238 Mass.
561, 131 N. E. 443 (1921) ; Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 15 N. J. Eq. 146 (1862) ; Grimm v. Grimm,
24 Pa. Dist. 9o (i914) ; see Dusenbury v. Dusenbury, 2o Pa. Dist. 678, 679 (191o).
5. Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 Pac. 8I (189o) ; Mohler v. Shank's Estate, 93 Iowa
273, 6i N. W. 981 (895); Parmelee v. Hutchins, 238 Mass. 56I, 131 N. E. 443 (192i) ;
Richardson's Estate, 132 Pa. 292, ig Atl. 82 (189o) ; Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S. C. 89, 118
S. E. 178 (1923).
6. Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 15 N. J. Eq. 146 (1862); Schneider v. Schneider, 232 App.
Div. 71, 249 N. Y. Supp. 31 (2d Dep't 1931).
7. Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 15 N. J. Eq. 146 (1862).
8. See Grimm v. Grimm, 24 Pa. Dist. 90, 92 (1914). There, plaintiff had obtained a
foreign decree of divorce with alimony, which was void in Pennsylvania. The court was of
the opinion that the respondent, by his remarriage, had been estopped from denying the validity of the decree. This, in effect, is another manner of stating that the respondent bad,
by his remarriage, waived his power to estop plaintiff from denying the validity of her foreign decree of divorce.
9. See Troy Union R. R. v. Troy, 227 App. Div. 351, 356, 238 N. Y. Supp. 577, 583
(Sup. Ct. 1929); Chernick v. National Surety Co., 5o R. I. 419, 422, 148 Atl. 418, 419
(1930).
1. W. VA. CODE (1931) c. Ii, art. 3, §§ 12, 13, 15, art. s, § i, art. 6, §2, art. 12, § 71,
art. I, § 79.
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assessment of its deposits and accounts receivable, only a fraction of which
were in local banks or represented local manufacture, on the ground that the
statute violated the "due process" clause. Held, that, as the corporation had
been so localized as to give the intangible personal property a business situs in
West Virginia, the tax was valid. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193
(1936).
Although the doctrine of mobilia sequunter personam has been discarded
as an absolute rule for determining the tax situs of tangible personalty, 2 courts
have been reluctant to depart from this facile fiction in the case of intangibles,3
and there were no serious inroads into the doctrine as applied to such property
until the development of the rule of "business situs". 4 At first permitting the
taxation of intangible personalty at the "business situs" only where there was
some concrete evidence of the property there,5 the courts later allowed assessment whether or not the checks, bond, or other tokens were physically present
in the taxing state, provided that the credits sought to be so taxed were continuously employed there.6 Most typical of the cases to which the latter doctrine
is applied are those in which an agent regularly lends money of a non-resident,
individual or corporate, or in which branches of foreign corporations permanently employ such property in competition with local business. 7 That the
tangible property of the corporation -is scattered over several states does not
relieve it from such tax, since the state has jurisdiction over the intangible
property so localized." However, the instant case goes far beyond previous
cases, which had determined only that particularintangible property had a tax
situs for purposes of this exception to the mobilia principle, by viewing the
entire corporate business as localized and therefore the intangible personalty
also, in the absence of a contrary showing. Such an extension of the application
of the rule of "business situs" considerably lightens the task of establishing the
prerequisites of jurisdiction for an ad valorem tax on intangibles, and will go
far to deter the establishment of purely nominal corporate domiciles as a means
of tax evasion. The possibility of further taxation on the same property by
Delaware, the state of incorporation, under the mobilia doctrine may result in
further action by the Supreme Court against multiple taxation. In the recent
cases forbidding double taxation of intangible property, the Court has consistently
reserved the question of double taxation of intangibles which have acquired a
2. Maxey, Situs of Personal Property for Purposes of Taxation (igig) 3 MINN. L.
REv. 217; Moore, The Doctrine of the Federal Courts as to the Situs of Personal Property
for Purposes of Taxation (1927)

14 VA. L. REv. 31.

3. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, IOO U. S. 491 (879) ; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. x94 (19o5) ; Cf. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (I919).
4. Tappan v. Merchant's Nat. Bank, ig Wall. 490 (U. S. 1874); New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (I899) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §465 et seq.; Note (1932)
76 A. L. R. 8o6; see Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 58 (1917).

5. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899) ; Bristol v. Washington County, 177
U. S. 133 (19oo) ; State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S.
388 (1goo).
6. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (19o7);
Liverpool L. & Q. Ins. Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 223 U. S. 346 (Ii1) ; Walker v.
Jack, 88 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; Powell, The Business Situs of Credits (1922) 28
W. VA. LAW Q. 89.

But see, In re Dodge Brothers, 243 Mich. 665, 217 N. W. 777 (1929),

27 MICH. L. Rm. B17.
7. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (899); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New
York v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (39o7) ; Armour Packing Co. v. Savannah, 1I5 Ga. 340,

criticized in (1929)

4r S. E. 237 (19o2) ; Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Assessors, ii5

La. 564, 39 So. 6oi (i9o5) ; Note (r932) 79 A. L. R. 344.
8. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. i85 (1897); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918).
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"business situs". 9 However, the sentiment of the Court, as expressed in the
instant case, and the extent to which the Court has here applied the "business
situs" rule suggest that restriction against multiple taxation in this situation is
not unlikely.

Taxation-Exemptions-Application of Federal Gift Tax to Gift of
First Liberty Loan Bonds-Petitioner made gifts of First Liberty Loan
bonds, the authorizing statute and face of which provided for exemption,
". .. as to principal and interest, from all taxation, except estate and inheritance taxes." I The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in gift taxes due from petitioner for the calendar year 1933, under the
Revenue Act of 1932,2 which had imposed a tax on inter %dvostransfers of
property by gift. Upon appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, held (one member
dissenting), that the gifts of the bonds were taxable, since a gift tax is an excise
on the transfer of property, and not a property tax. Lawrence C. Phipps, 34
B. T. A. 641 (1936).
While the basic nature of the gift tax actually controlled the decision in the
instant case, the decision seemed to turn on an interpretation of the statute
authorizing the bond issue rather than on the interpretation of the Revenue Act.
Even if we interpret the loan act narrowly; by a strict application of the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,3 it would not necessarily follow that the
gift tax upon the bonds was invalid merely because the authorizing statute
provides for only two express exceptions from the provision of general taxexemption. 4 The tax might still be valid because it is basically so closely allied
to the estate and inheritance taxes, being, like them, not a property tax, but
rather a tax upon the transfer of property.5 Furthermore, the gift tax was
enacted primarily to prevent avoidance of the estate and inheritance taxes. 6
A fortiori, if the authorizing statute is broadly interpreted and the decisions
which give little credence to the maxim of narrow construction are followed, 7
the conclusion would necessarily be inevitable, in the light of well-established
9. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1929) ; Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U. S. 586 (1930) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. i (i931).
I. 40 STAT. 35 (917),

31 U. S. C. A. § 746 (1934).

". .

. The principal and interest

of this bond shall be . . . exempt, both as to principal and interest, from all taxation, except estate or inheritance taxes, imposed by authority of the United States, or its possessions,
or by any State or local taxing authority."
2. 47 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1934). "...
a tax . . . shall be imposed upon the transfer . . . by any individual, resident or nonresident, of property by gift.
The tax shall apply . . . whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is
real or personal, tangible or intangible."
3. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 438 (U. S. 1827) ; Arnold v. United States,
147 U. S. 494, 499 (1892) ; BROom, LEGAL MAxIMs (9th ed. 1924) 427.
4. But see dissenting opinion in instant case at 643.
5. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 (1895) ; Billings v. United States, 232 U. S.
261 (1914) (tax on actual use distinguished from tax on power to use) ; Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U. S. 384 (1921) ; Bromley v. McCaughn, 28o U. S. 124 (1929) ; Blodgett v. Holden,
ii F. (2d) i8o, 187 (D. C. Mich. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 275 U. S. 142 (1927) (tax
on transfer as distinguished from tax on right to transfer). U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 4, 2
C. C. H. 1936 Fed. Tax Serv. § 229IG ("The gift tax was imposed as a corollary to the estate
tax . . .").
6. See Blodgett v. Holden, i1 F. (2d) i8o, 182 (D. C. Mich. 1926), rev'd on other
grounds, 275 U. S. 142 (1927) ; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 836.
7. See United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513, 519 (1912) ; Garrison v. Shreveport, 179
La. 605, 613, 154 So. 622, 624 (1934) ; Colquhoun v. Brooks, 21 Q. B. D. 52, 65 (x888).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

authority, that the gift tax upon the transfer of the bonds was valid, since the
courts have uniformly declared that the words "exempt from all 8taxation" mean
exempt only from all direct, and not from indirect taxation. And in the
analogous case of securities which contained no exceptions from the clause of
general tax-exemption, the courts have consistently sustained 9the imposition of
taxes upon the exercise of one of the various property rights, as distinguished
from a tax upon the owner solely because of his ownership irrespective of the
use or disposition made of his property. 10 Furthermore, it appears from the
nature of the taxes excluded from the exemption clause, that had the gift tax
law existed at the time of the passage of the statute authorizing the bonds in
question, Congress probably would have added the gift tax to the estate and
inheritance taxes, as an exception to the tax-exemption provision. Therefore,
the Board appears to have carried out the intent of Congress; and, considering
the decided and desirable tendency on the part of the courts to interpret
sympathetically congressional measures aimed to prevent avoidance of taxes,"L
and to fully effectuate the spirit of such legislation despite the ambiguous language of many statutes, the Board seems justified in its decision.
Taxation-Share Dividends as Income-A corporation awarded common shares as a dividend to holders of preferred, cumulative, non-voting shares.
Thereafter, a shareholder sold the preferred shares, and in her income tax returns
used the original cost of the preferred shares as the basis for the determination of
her capital gain. The commissioner, following the Treasury Regulations,' assessed the tax by dividing the original cost of the preferred shares among the total
number of shares, both common and preferred, held by the taxpayer before the
sale of the preferred shares, thus arriving at a lower cost for the preferred shares,
and thereby increasing the amount of the gain and the tax. Held (two justices
dissenting), that the share dividend constituted income, rather than a return of
capital, and therefore the original cost of the preferred shares was to be used in
ascertaining the gain upon their sale. Koshland v. Helvering, 56 Sup. Ct. 767
(1936).
For a discussion of this case, especially with reference to its importance
under the Revenue Act of 1936, see pages IOO et seq. of this issue of the REvIEw.
Torts-Recovery Under Death Statute by Father Against Estate of
Deceased Daughter's Husband-Father sued estate of deceased daughter's
husband under the Pennsylvania death statute I for loss of the daughter's contributions to his support, alleging that her husband had negligently caused her
death. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, despite the common law
bar in Pennsylvania to suits for personal torts by a woman against her husband.
Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski, 184 Atl. 663 (Pa. 1936).
The great majority of American courts, in construing death statutes, have
followed the English view that although the statutes conferred a new and dis8. Knowlton v. Moore, i78 U. S. 41 (i899); Plumber v. Coler, 178 U. S. 15 (899);
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (I92O).
9. Plumber v. Coler, 178 U. S. I15 (1899) (inheritance tax) ; Edgar A. Igleheart, 28 B.
T. A. 88 (1935) (estate tax).
io. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6oi (1895).
ii. See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 9o (935).
i. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Arts. 115-7, ii5-8.
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tinct right of action,2 recovery would be denied unless the decedent had. had a
right of action at the time of his death.8 Thus, the cases have held that if the
decedent had been contributorily negligent, 4 or had accepted settlement of his
claim or executed a release therefor," or had recovered in an action for damages,8 recovery in an action under a death statute would be barred.7 These
conclusions have been based primarily upon the specific requirement of Lord
Campbell's Act," substantially copied in most American death statutes, 9 that the
tortious act must be ". . . such as would, if death had not ensued, have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof .... ,"1o And, although the Pennsylvania death statute omits this
clause and provides instead, that the named beneficiaries may recover "whenever . . . no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or
her life . . .,,11 Pennsylvania courts have nevertheless followed the general
view.1 2 Therefore, at least in result, the instant case would seem to represent
a noteworthy departure from strict adherence to this view. The spirit and
rationale of the opinion, however, leave scant hope that this exception to the
rule will be extended much further. In the first place, the decision was based
largely upon a former Pennsylvania case,18 not involving a death statute, in
which the court refused to extend the personal immunity of a husband from
suit by his wife, to an action by his wife against his employer for an injury
inflicted on the wife by the husband, in the scope of his employment. In addition, the court, citing some of its former decisions, reasserted the derivative
nature of the death action, although it did distinguish between the instant
situation and the prior cases on the ground that the "...
derivation . . .
See Blake v. Midlands Ry., I8 Q. B. 93, 1IO (1852).
3. Read v. Great Eastern Ry., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 (x868) (accord and satisfaction by decedent held bar to death action). For criticisms of this view, see Smith, An Argument for a
New Application of Lord Campbell's Act (932) 7 Amt. L. S. REv. 553 (propounding a hypothetical case similar in facts to the instant case) ; Schumacher, Rights of Action Under
Death and Survival Statutes (1924) 23 MIcH. L. REV. 114; Note (1932) U. oF PA. L. REv.
993.
4. See 2 COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) § 211, n. 96, for a comprehensive list of cases on
this point.
5.Louisville Ry. v. Raymond's Adm'r, 135 Ky. 738, 123 S. W. 281 (igog). Contra:
Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 2oi, i5i N. W. iooi (i915) (excellent analysis of death statute);
see Note (915) 28 HAuv. L. Rzv. 802.
6. Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24 (882) ; Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170
N. C. 55I, 87 S.E. 635 (ii6), Note 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 626.
7-Courts are divided on the question whether the running of the statute of limitations
against the decedent's right of action is a bar to an action under a death statute, the majority
holding that it is no bar. See Notes (932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REV. 993, 997, n. 31, 32; (1931)
72 A. L. R. 1316 (collection of cases).
8. 9 & io VICT., c. 93 (1846).
9. TIFFANY, DEATH Y WRONGFUL AcT (2d ed. 1913) § 63. Also see analytical table
of the state statutes, id. at XX.
10. 9 & IoVicr., c. 93, § i (1846).
II. PA.STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § x6oi.
12. Grant v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. R., 215 Pa. 265, 64 Atl. 463 (I9O6) (contributory
negligence) ; Hill v. Pennsylvania R. R., 178 Pa. 223, 35 At]. 997 (1896) (release) ; Howard
v. Bell Telephone Co., 306 Pa. 518, i6o Atl. 613 (1932), aff'g I5 D. & C. 411 (Pa. 1931), 80
U. OF PA.L. REV. 305 (statute of limitations). Of course, under the specific language of the
death statute, a former recovery by the decedent bars recovery in a death action. In one
extreme case, it was held that statements of the decedent tending to prove his contributory
negligence were admissible, under the "admissions" exception to the hearsay rule, in an
action by his widow under the death statute. Hughes v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 176
Pa. 254, 35 Atl. i9o (I896).
13. Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 Atl. 792 (1935), 84 U. oF PA. L. REV. 791 (1936).
2.
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However,
is from the tortious act, and not from the person of the deceased".
a logical extension of this distinction would seem to require, even if the court
should insist upon the contributory negligence of the decedent remaining as a
bar to a death action, that a beneficiary should not be barred from recovery by
the fact that the statute of limitations has run against the decedent, or that the
decedent has settled or released his claim. In both these cases, certainly, the
remedy only, and not the original tortious nature of the act, is involved.

Trusts-Apportionment of Mortgage Loss Between Life Tenant and
Remainderman-Trustees foreclosed mortgages, bought in the properties at
sheriff's sale, and after an interval, sold them for less than the amounts secured by
the mortgages. Exceptions to the auditing judge's apportionment of the proceeds
were filed by the trustees and representatives of the remainderman. Held, that
the share of the net proceeds allocated to income should be the proportion which
the total income loss bore to the total of both principal investment and income
loss, the income loss being computed by allowing the mortgage rate of interest
for the period between default and foreclosure, and the current rate of return on
trust investments thereafter until resale. Nirdlinger'sEstate, 26 D. & C. 3 (Pa.
1936), appeal filed, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, June i9, p. i, col. 6 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1936).
Despite the frequent mortgage defaults of recent years, the question involved
in the instant case has never been adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. At first glance, some doubt might be entertained as to whether the life
tenant should be entitled to any share in the proceeds of a sale resulting in a net
loss to the corpus. However, it must be remembered that the mortgage was
given as security for both principal and income, both of which, therefore, should
have received a share in the sum realized upon its liquidation. 1 Moreover, as
was pointed out in a recent article in a previous issue of this REVIEw, 2 upon
which the court relied as its principal authority, it is manifestly inequitable in the
ordinary case to deprive the life tenant of income over a long period of years in
order that the maximum amount of principal may be salvaged solely for the
remainderman's benefit, especially in view of the not unwarranted probability
that the former beneficiary was "the primary object of the settlor's . . .bounty".3
And, therefore, apportionment, on one 4theory or another, is favored in the
majority of American and English cases.
A more difficult problem arises in the determination of the rate of interest
to be employed in computing the total income loss. 5 Some courts, viewing the
whole transaction as the salvage of a security representing principal and income,
allow the mortgage rate to continue for the entire period between default and
14. Instant case at 664.
i. See instant case at 8.
2. Bailey and Rice, The Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Invest-

ments (1935, 1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 157, 227, 625 (containing a full discussion of this
and such related problems as the allocation of carrying charges and rents during the period
of trustee ownership).
3. Id. at x67.
4. E. g., Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J.Eq. 2o6, 21 Atl. 86o (1891) ; Roosevelt v. Roosevelt,
5 Redf. Surr. 264 (N. Y. 1881); Meldon v. Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N. Y. Supp. 172
(Ist Dep't 1898), aff'd 167 N. Y. 573, 6o N. E. iix6 (19Ol); In re Moore, 54 L. J. Ch. (x.
s.) 432 (885) ; In re Plumb, 27 Ont. 6ol (1898). See Newhall, Apportionment of Losses
on Mortgage Foreclosures (1933) 18 MASs. L. Q. (No. 5) 81.
5. For an extended discussion, see Bailey and Rice, supra note 3, at 172-178, 625-628;
Matter of Pelcyger, 157 Misc. 913, 925-942, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 735-754 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
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resale.6 Others, employing a doctrine of "equitable conversion" 7 whereby unproductive trust property is treated as though it had been converted into other
forms of investment, allow the current rate of income generally yielded by trust
estates throughout." In the instant case, the two methods of apportionment are
combined, a distinction being drawn between the periods before and after foreclosure. 9 As to the prior period, this seems to be the most satisfactory solution
of the problem, for after acquisition of title by the trustees, the life tenant and
remainderman become equitable owners of the foreclosed property in the proportion of their respective interests in it, namely unpaid interest as of foreclosure,
0
and the principal sum of the bond.Y
Certainly, then, the life tenant should
obtain an apportionment of the proceeds at least to this extent. However, if he
is to be granted a fixed return for the period of ownership, regardless of whether
or not the property in fact produced any net income, resort must be had to the
ficti6n of "equitable conversion". And in reality, what happens under any theory
is that a certain sum is taken out of the corpus and turned over to the life tenant
in the guise of income. Therefore, it would be well if no theory became too
firmly settled, but an attempt were made in the individual case to approach as
nearly as possible to an application of what the settlor's desires appear to have
been.
6. Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl.. 86o (1891) ; Matter of Chapal, 269 N. Y.
464, igg N. E. 762 (1936) semble; cf. In re Moore, 54 L. J. Ch. (x. s.) 432 (1885) in which
the mortgage rate was allowed only until foreclosure, no interest being allowed thereafter.
7. RESTATEMEiT, TRuSTS (1935) § 241, comment b; see also Note (1936) 49 HAv. L.
REv. 805.
8. Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 5 Redf. Surr. 264 (N. Y. 1881) ; Quinn v. First Nat. Bank,
x68 Tenn. 30, 73 S. W. (2d) 692 (934).
q. Accord: Matter of Otis, 158 Misc. 808, 287 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Matter
of Marshall, 43 Misc. 238, 88 N. Y. Supp. 55o (Surr. Ct. 19o4) semble. These are apparently
the only two cases which have so held.
io. See Matter of Pelcyger, 157 Misc. 913, 933, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 744 (Surr Ct. 1936).

